The Concept of Moral Progress by Frauke Albersmeier

Author:Frauke Albersmeier
Language: eng
Format: epub, pdf
Publisher: De Gruyter
Published: 2022-12-06T09:17:53.706000+00:00

4.2.3

Uncertainty Regarding the Roles of Theory and Practice

Deciding whether moral progress must include—or could even consist entirely in—a change on the theoretical side of morality bears on many different areas of interest, marked by reasonable disagreement. For instance, a tendency toward a consequentialist, a Kantian or virtue ethical approach would make, in that order, the priority of practice, the priority of theory or a requirement for interaction between both seem more plausible. Which of these we regard to be crucial for moral progress also bears on the plausibility of the claim that moral progress has occurred in the past and can be pursued in the future. It also has implications for the kind of evidence that could be presented in order to back up such claims and the means by which moral progress is to be pursued. Furthermore, it determines the range of possible downsides to any seemingly progressive development: if moral progress requires theoretical resources, any prima facie improvement in practices that comes with a disadvantage in terms of moral awareness might not be deemed an instance of moral progress overall. This is the concern Mill raises with respect to the proliferation of true beliefs (see § 3.4); as a true belief becomes widely accepted, people’s grasp of it decreases because they are no longer challenged to defend it. The same concern could be raised about moral change. For instance, the proliferation of human rights could make it the case that moral agents' understanding of the “moral rights doctrine” abates. Even if the development were to be judged as progressive all-things-considered, should the decline in understanding (i. e., the regress on the theoretical side of morality) be counted as diminishing the amount of moral progress that has been made? Finally, clarifying the role of the theoretical side of morality (conceived as relating to morally charged mental states in distinction from practices) for the attribution of moral progress also bears on the question of what moral philosophy has to contribute to moral progress. Some authors who take part in the contemporary debate on moral progress are quite optimistic about ethics’ relevance to moral progress (Nussbaum 2007; Elzanowski 2013), but the extent to which we can expect moral theory (in the narrow sense of systematic rational engagement with questions of and about morality) to contribute to moral progress depends on whether we are ready to recognize the kind of improvement it can involve as constitutive for moral progress. If moral progress consisted entirely in changes in moral views, the potential contributions of moral philosophy to moral progress would be indefinitely more substantial than if moral progress was construed as requiring changes in practices as well.

The question of whether we should incorporate a requirement for practical change in our account of moral progress or whether moral progress might be made merely by achieving improvements in one’s moral views will be taken on in the following subsection. Depending on how we frame this question, the idea that theoretical improvements might suffice for making moral progress can seem outright absurd.

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